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NARRATIVES OF LEGITIMACY: POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN 
THE EARLY PHASE OF THE TROUBLES IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND 
 
Sissel Rosland 
Abstract 
This article examines the discursive construction of legitimacy in the early 
phase of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The empirical material covers the 
debate on internment without trial from 1971 till 1975 – a debate which 
involved conflicting claims of legitimacy. Some strongly defended internment 
as a legitimate step in the fight against the IRA, whilst others regarded it as 
an illegitimate measure employed by a corrupt political regime. These 
conflicting claims of legitimacy entailed a conceptual battle concerned with 
the construction and authorisation of political order. The article explores 
this battle along three dimensions: law, violence, and democracy. 
 
Introduction 
 
On the 9
th
 of August 1971 the government of Northern Ireland 
introduced internment without trial.
1
 Internment was meant to curb the 
escalating conflict in Northern Ireland. However, when internment was 
ended four years later, this aim had not been reached: Cease-fires had come 
and gone; peace proposals had emerged and failed; and more than 1,300 
people had died.
2
 
 This paper will explore the construction of legitimacy in Northern 
Irish political discourse in the early phase of the Troubles. The empirical 
focal point is the debate on internment. The general conclusion of many 
commentators has been that internment alienated the Catholic population in 
Northern Ireland (see Arthur, 2001, p. 114; Murray, 1998 p. 18; McAllister, 
1977, p. 97-103; Ruane and Todd, 1997, p. 130; Staunton, 2001, p. 276.) The 
undermining of state legitimacy can be seen already in the process of re-
politicisation in the late 1960s. This process was, however, accelerated and 
shaped by internment which accentuated a wide range of contentious issues.  
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The debate on internment involved conflicting claims of legitimacy: 
some strongly defended internment as a legitimate step in the fight against 
the IRA, whilst others regarded it as an illegitimate measure employed by a 
corrupt political regime. These conflicting claims of legitimacy entailed what 
I, inspired by Frank Burton‟s (1978, p. 104) phrase, will call “a conceptual 
battle” concerned with the construction and authorisation of political order.  
 
Interpreting Legitimacy 
The concept of legitimacy is used in a variety of disciplines due to its 
usefulness in the conceptualisation of the process whereby authority is 
produced not by force but by voluntary obedience (Barker, 1990, p. 11). It 
has been pointed out that studies of legitimacy have dealt with a growing 
number of institutions, linking their stability and the consensus they enjoy to 
the existence of legitimacy (Zelditch, 2001, p. 40).  But the concept of 
legitimacy is not only applicable to a situation of stability. By paying 
attention to disobedience, light may be cast on the conditions of and reasons 
for obedience, since it is often the case that the reasons for behaving in a 
particular way are more clearly stated when that form of behaviour is 
threatened or in decline, than when it is commonplace (Barker, 1990, p. 6). 
The concept of legitimacy has been closely connected to the name of 
Max Weber, and he represents what we might call a “subjectivist” approach 
to legitimacy (Weber, 1978). He stressed the empirical and historical 
character of legitimacy, rather than its normative validity. To Weber it was 
not legitimacy as such, but the search for legitimacy, which characterised 
states, and he was subsequently interested in studying how authority and 
compliance were justified. “Legitimacy” as used by Weber was thus both a 
belief held by subjects and a claim made by rulers (Barker, 1990, p. 59).
3
 
In studies that have dealt with issues of legitimacy in conflicts, 
different conceptions of legitimacy have been employed. One approach has 
dealt with non-state violence as a problem or as a challenge to the state. The 
concept of legitimacy is rarely explicitly discussed in such studies, but it is 
taken for granted that legitimacy derives from the law (see, for example, 
Phillips, 1990, p. 77 and Wilkinson, 1990, p. 48). Since legitimacy here is 
viewed as a mere reflection of law, other claims to legitimacy seem to be 
overruled and ignored.  
This approach has been challenged, however, and starting from a 
critical view of Jürgen Habermas‟ theories, the political theorist Shane 
O‟Neill O‟Neill has developed a framework for a critical discourse theory of 
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democracy (see O‟Neill, 2000 and 2002). O‟Neill stresses the importance of 
linking legitimacy to other sources than current law: for a law to be 
legitimate it is also necessary that the law be passed without violation of the 
free use of communicative reason (O‟Neill, 2000, p. 506).  
In contrast to these (implicit or explicit) normative perspectives, some 
studies have applied a more subjectivist concept of legitimacy through 
studying how legitimacy has been established within a particular context (see 
Burton, 1978; also Sluka, 1989 and Feldman, 1991). The issue of legitimacy 
is particularly significant in a study by the sociologist Frank Burton (1978) 
who in his book The Politics of Legitimacy, argues that the quest for 
legitimacy is waged in a conceptual battlefield where: “claims and counter-
claims represent ideological struggles within a discourse of legitimacy” (p. 
104). Burton follows the subjectivist approach in examining the contextual 
and conceptual bases of these claims, rather than their normative validity. 
This article analyses the construction of legitimacy as a discursive 
process. Having the historical character of the process of legitimisation at 
heart, this study resembles the subjectivist perspective of Weber and Burton 
rather than the normative perspectives. For the present purpose, discourse 
will be defined as practises that constitute the objects of which they speak 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 49). This concept of discourse highlights the constitutive 
aspect of language and implies that power is constituted by “regimes of 
truth” concerned with the creation of an ontological, political, and moral 
order (see Malkki, 1995, p. 194, and Foucault, 1980, p. 13).  
The public utterances are embedded within a historical context, and in 
the debate the participants negotiate meanings which are never fixed but 
continually undergoing contestation and redefinition (Chadwick, 2000, p. 
292). A central challenge when researching the discursive construction of 
legitimacy is to find a way to examine how participants in the public debate 
represent the relationship between the state and the people. In the case of the 
internment debate, three dimensions stand out as particularly significant in 
the construction of legitimacy: law, violence, and democracy. Firstly, law 
was significant since much of the debate related to the legitimacy of the 
emergency powers, which legalised internment without trial. Secondly, the 
debate was closely linked to the issue of violence: the escalation of 
paramilitary violence was given as the main reason for the introduction and 
continuation of internment, and in addition, the issue of state violence 
surfaced through allegations that internees had been subjected to torture. 
Thirdly, the debate exposed conflicting views on the characteristics of “true 
democracy” and the status of the Northern Ireland state as democratic or 
undemocratic.  
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 In the following, we will explore how different narratives of 
legitimacy were constructed around these dimensions. But first, I will give a 
brief outline of the political situation at the time of the internment debate. 
 
 
Political Context 
 
The political landscape in which the debate on internment took place 
was rapidly changing. In contrast to the previous fifty years – in which the 
Unionist Party had stayed continuously in power and nationalist opposition 
had become something of an empty exercise – the state in Northern Ireland 
was gradually re-politicised in the late sixties. Inspired by the civil rights 
movement in the United States, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association (NICRA) was established, attracting support particularly from 
young Catholics, but also initially from Protestants. Thus in the early 1970s 
the composition of Northern Ireland‟s political spectrum changed 
considerably. 
 On the unionist side, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) was still by far 
the largest party. It was, however, experiencing a growing internal division 
as well as increasing opposition from other unionist parties, in particular by 
Rev. Ian Paisley and his Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) founded in 
September 1971. DUP soon became an important force in Northern Ireland 
politics and a persistent threat to the traditional dominance of the UUP. The 
UUP was also challenged by a new right-wing pressure group, Ulster 
Vanguard, and several loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA). On the other 
side of the political spectrum, the UUP also lost supporters to a new 
moderate and liberal party founded in April 1970. This party, called the 
Alliance Party, gained support from a section of liberal Unionists who had 
left the UUP and from some former members of the Labour party. The party 
hoped to draw support from both Protestants and Catholics.  
 On the nationalist side the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP), founded in August 1970, rapidly became the most important 
political force rapidly surpassing the old Nationalist party. It presented itself 
as a radical, left-of-centre party and was backed by former supporters of the 
Nationalist party as well as members of the civil rights movement. The other 
strand within nationalist politics, the republican movement, was in 1970 split 
on the issue of recognition of – and abstention from – the Belfast and Dublin 
Parliaments. The party Sinn Féin then became two parties: Official Sinn 
Féin, a left-wing party, (also going under the name “Republican Clubs”) 
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which called for an end to abstentionism, and Provisional Sinn Féin, the 
party generally known as “Sinn Féin”, which remained abstentionist into the 
next decade.  
  
 
Dimensions of Legitimacy: Law 
 
The power to use internment without trial was laid down in the Special 
Powers Act from 1922. Whereas the government legitimised internment as 
the lesser of two evils, the anti-internment movement rejected the alternative 
altogether. In general, unionists presented the internment powers in terms of 
function and order, whereas the nationalist opposition portrayed them in 
terms of principles, human rights and freedom. 
 
Unionist Discourse on “Law” 
 
When introducing internment, the UUP government characterised the 
situation as war. The image of an emergency was supported by firm 
evidence: statistics showed that violence had escalated from the beginning of 
January up to the introduction of internment in August 1971. In an initial 
statement the government pointed out that the figures revealed, “not only a 
sustained, but a mounting pattern of violence, which could not be borne in 
any community determined to stay alive.” The government had no choice, it 
argued, but to enact the provisions of the Special Powers Act (Government 
Statement, 21 August 1971). 
 The use of emergency powers was not regarded as an ideal solution, 
but rather as the only viable option in the struggle for the restoration of order 
(Brian Faulkner, The Guardian, 16 September 1971). Captain Lawrence Orr, 
the leader of the Ulster Unionists at Westminster, was confident that, 
although internment would not reconcile the opposing factions in Ulster, it 
was certainly a step on the way to bringing order back to the streets (The 
Guardian, 16 September 1971). The Prime Minister Brian Faulkner claimed 
to know the identity of the perpetrators, and internment was thus a useful 
instrument, because it only affected people who had “murdered in cold 
blood” (Belfast Telegraph, 9 August 1971).  
The fundamental trust in the internment procedures was an essential 
element in the unionist government‟s defence of the emergency legislation. 
The prime minister declared that emergency powers were used with 
reluctance (Belfast Telegraph, 9 August 1971) and he stressed that the 
government had established a three-man advisory committee to review pleas 
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made by individual internees (The Guardian, 16 September 1971). But in the 
end, the decision whether a person was to be interned or not, was in the 
hands of the prime minister. This should provide further reassurance, 
Faulkner argued, putting his own integrity and authority on the line as a 
guarantee for fair treatment: “I am not prepared to sign internment orders on 
anybody unless I am persuaded that person has played a very direct role in 
violence in Northern Ireland” (Belfast Telegraph, 9 August 1971). 
In a letter to The Times the Unionist MP, James Molyneaux, explicitly 
declared that he regarded internment to be a denial of “fundamental 
liberties.” But, he argued, internment was not only about individual liberties, 
there were also other important liberties to preserve, he argued: “there is also 
the fundamental liberty of every British citizen to live at peace under the 
law.” Liberties had to be considered in context, he argued, and liberty to live 
at peace under the law ought to take priority (The Times, 16 August 1971).  
As shown above, the unionist government viewed the internment 
powers as secure, just and legitimate because they were settled in current 
law. Within such a framework the only valid political question regarding 
internment was whether it served the purpose of restoring order or not. Some 
voices within the unionist opposition, however, presented another answer to 
this question. Ian Paisley argued against internment and rejected the Prime 
Minister‟s claim that he had no choice but to introduce internment. He 
claimed that Faulkner had tried to mislead the country by announcing he was 
introducing internment as a last resort. According to Paisley this was a 
deliberate falsehood, as not all processes of the law had been used against the 
IRA (News Letter, 10 August 1971). Still, the unionist opposition mainly 
presented the internment powers in terms of function (for a further 
discussion, see Rosland, 2003). 
 
Nationalist Discourse on “Law” 
 
Whereas the unionist government presented the emergency powers in 
terms of restoring order, the nationalist opposition immediately challenged 
this priority. A cross-party statement including politicians, priests and 
representatives of professional and business life in Northern Ireland, summed 
up this view, pointing out that preserving human rights rather than order was 
the most fundamental purpose of law:  
A society without order is a distressed society, but a society without 
freedom is not a society at all. If a choice must be made between the 
legal preservation of order and the legal preservation of freedom, 
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freedom must take priority (Statement in Irish News, 4 September 
1971) 
The opposition built its case against the powers of internment around 
two issues. Firstly, that the power to intern was a perversion of law denying 
individual fundamental rights; secondly, that the unionist government used 
internment deliberately as a political weapon to silence the opposition. The 
opposition believed internment to be an indefensible evil itself, irrespective 
of circumstances (Statement in Irish News, 4 September 1971). Labelling 
internment “a perversion of law”, the signatories of the cross-party statement 
particularly stressed that the emergency powers eliminated the restraints on 
power. By lowering the standards for evidence of guilt, persons could be 
imprisoned on the basis of evidence that was unknown to them and which in 
ordinary law would be seen as inadmissible.
 
The internees themselves 
protested against not being given the opportunity to defend themselves 
against decisive yet secret evidence (Statement by internees in Crumlin Road 
Prison, Irish News, 23 August 1971). In an open letter to the British Home 
Secretary, the Derry branch of the SDLP argued that the emergency powers 
in Northern Ireland did not adhere to the standards of English justice: 
To you, internment in Northern Ireland may be only an abstract word in 
a faraway place. You well know that English law in England holds the 
liberty of the subject in high regard and that a man is innocent until 
proven guilty. Only in the gravest circumstances such as the major wars 
does your English Government set aside these laws and even then, they 
try to ensure the minimum affront to the dignity of the person and the 
maximum safeguard for rights and welfare. Contrast this with what you 
have allowed in Northern Ireland (Irish News, 18 December 1971). 
Explaining the direct effects of this point, a leading article in the Irish 
News, observed that by using the Special Powers Act, members of the Police 
Special Branch were able to re-arrest men who had earlier been found 
innocent by ordinary juries. According to the newspaper this practise 
undermined individual liberty which was no longer protected by law, but was 
at the arbitrary disposition of Prime Minister Brian Faulkner (Irish News, 25 
November 1971). 
 
Competing Approaches to Law 
 
To sum up, the crucial point of division on the issue of emergency 
powers concerned the balance between order and rights: whereas Faulkner 
and the government assigned priority to the restoration of order, their critics 
asserted that the most fundamental task of the law was to preserve the rights 
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of the individual and to restrain the power of the state. On this ground the 
opposition ruled out Faulkner‟s “lesser of two evils”-argument, arguing 
instead that internment never could be the lesser of two evils.
 
 
It has been argued that by establishing what Homi Bhabha has labelled 
“counter-narratives” (Bhabha, 1990, p. 300), marginalized groups can resist 
hegemonic representations (Perry in Graham, 2001, p. 86). History has 
shown that whereas the “positive rights” approach has tended to support 
established authority, the theories of “natural rights” have been connected to 
opposition against authorities. The theories of Rousseau and other natural 
rights theorists produced a notion of legitimacy that transcended the 
procedures and authority of the state, thus making possible the idea of a 
legitimate revolution. With legitimacy residing in “a state of nature”, rather 
than in the state, a sense of essential commonality is produced beyond 
governmental procedures (Wolin, 1996, p. 41).
 
 
 
Dimensions of Legitimacy: Violence 
 
To talk of legitimate violence in the debate on internment seem to be a 
contradiction in terms. The word “violence” was rarely used to describe what 
the speaker viewed as a “legitimate” use of force, whether this be by British 
soldiers or paramilitary “defenders” and “freedom fighters”; “violence” was 
the force perpetrated by one‟s opponent.  
In their proposed role as peacekeepers in the increasingly troubled 
society, the security forces had already entered the front stage of Northern 
Ireland politics before the introduction of internment. Yet, their critical 
function in the operation of internment regarding arrests and interrogation 
made the security forces even more contentious.
4
 
 
Competing Discourses on the Security Forces 
 
Almost immediately after the first arrests on the morning of 9 August 
1971, there appeared allegations of brutal treatment of the internees (see for 
example Irish News, 10 August, 1971; Irish News, 13 August 1971). In a 
joint statement the SDLP, the Nationalist party, the Republican Labour party 
and NICRA proclaimed: “We demand that the military resume the role for 
which they were sent here, the protection of people and areas against 
sectarian attacks on their homes pending a political solution (joint statement, 
Irish News, 10 August 1971). The stories of mistreatment grew in number 
during the first months of internment as several internees got to tell their 
stories to the newspapers.
5
 Under pressure from nationalists in Northern 
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Ireland, the government of the Republic of Ireland lodged a series of 
complaints at the European Commission of Human Rights at Strasbourg in 
December 1971. The Irish government alleged that British policy in Northern 
Ireland had degenerated to a military assault on the minority in violation of 
the European Convention of Human Rights (Boyle, 1974). Several persons 
also submitted individual petitions to the commission (Boyle, 1974).
6
 
Nationalists, thus, in general described the treatment of internees as 
brutal and inhumane, and a violation of the rights of the individual. The ill-
treatment was not in the main regarded as evidence of the evilness of the 
interrogators, but rather as the product of an aggressive state (see Rosland, 
2003). Consequently, government inquiries into the matter could never be 
trusted. Legitimacy had to be authorised elsewhere, and it is consistent with 
this standpoint that nationalists looked to the Republic of Ireland and the 
international human rights commission for confirmation of the perceived 
illegitimacy of state violence in Northern Ireland.  
In unionist statements, on the other hand, the security forces were 
portrayed primarily as responsible protectors characterised by virtues as 
heroism and victimhood. Already shortly after the introduction of 
internment, the Prime Minister hailed it as a great success, which allowed the 
security forces to work efficiently in their “relentless” struggle against the 
IRA (Daily Mail, 16 September 1971). In October, Faulkner concluded: “I 
think in the last three months that the security forces have got very positively 
and demonstrably on top of the situation” (News Letter, 27 October 1971).  
When rumours of mistreatment started to circulate, the government, 
were keen to respond and assured the public that any claim of ill treatment 
would be impartially investigated (News Letter, 16 August 1971). Yet, 
questioning the mistreatment allegations, James Kilfedder of the UUP 
suspected that the internees, in order to safeguard themselves against charges 
of being informers, were fabricating allegations of Army brutality (Belfast 
Telegraph, 20 October 1971). At the same time he contended that the 
security forces should be allowed to use some kind of force, if this could 
shorten the conflict. One had to choose between the terrorists and the 
soldiers, Kilfedder argued, concluding that the soldiers‟ lives ought to be 
regarded as more important than “the injured feelings of the terrorists” 
(Belfast Telegraph, 20 October 1971).  
Although the general unionist view was that the security forces were to 
be trusted, there were some exceptions to this pattern. In some cases 
involving loyalist paramilitaries loyalist and unionist politicians criticised the 
Army for mistreatment. After an incident in the Maze prison in late 1973 that 
left several loyalist internees injured, both Ian Paisley and the UDA 
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condemned the troops for mistreating the internees (see Daily Mail 20 
December 1973; News Letter, 20 December 1973; Irish Times, 20 December 
1973). This occasional criticism, however, did not challenge the main 
representation of the security forces as protectors of common good.  
 
Competing Discourses on Paramilitaries 
The debate on internment exposes several conflicting interpretations of 
the justification and responsibility for paramilitary violence. According to 
the government, the IRA was organising “a campaign of murder” with the 
“responsibility for death and suffering of innocent people” (News Letter, 16 
August 1971) and Prime Minister Brian Faulkner branded the IRA campaign 
“an armed conspiracy whose immediate purpose is to destroy the peace, 
stability and security in this part of the UK” (Daily Mail, 16 September 
1971). The Prime Minister also stressed that the IRA was isolated from the 
Catholic population, which it claimed to be representing. The main 
distinction went not along religious lines, he argued, but between those who 
pursued their ends democratically and those who wished to impose their 
views by violence (News Letter 13.09.71 and Irish Times, 15 April 1974).  
The Alliance party also to a certain extent supported the image of the 
isolated terrorist (see, for example, Oliver Napier in Belfast Telegraph, 12 
August 1971). Yet, the Alliance Party believed that introducing internment 
would increase rather than curb the escalating violence (see for example Bob 
Cooper in Irish News, 21 August 1971 and Oliver Napier in Irish News, 26 
July 1974). Alliance reflections on terrorism thus, instead of drawing a 
definite line between the agent of violence and the victim, indicated that “the 
terrorist” could be both an agent of violence and a victim.  
This logic was taken even further in the statements of the SDLP, which 
firmly situated the republican paramilitary within Northern Ireland society. 
Although condemning their use of violence, the SDLP also viewed 
republican paramilitaries as “victims of the past”, thus placing the 
responsibility of paramilitary violence not only on the individual IRA 
members but on the Northern Ireland state (see for example John Hume in 
Irish Times, 3 December 1973). The paramilitaries were also frequently 
singled out as agents of counter-productive violence. Violence, then, was 
depicted as both immoral and futile:  
We believe in political means and political means alone. Anyone who 
looks at our community to-day must be convinced that other than 
political means only leads us deeper and deeper into the mire and 
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increases the suffering of all our people (John Hume, Irish News, 1 July 
1974)   
Hume also argued that the responsibility for ending internment rested 
partly with the IRA: if violence stopped, there would be no justification for 
the continuation of internment (Irish News, 1 December 1973). 
Few statements in the debate on internment, even from the republican 
movement, explicitly defended the IRA as a violent agent.
7
 The purpose of 
the IRA violence, however, was made very clear: it was to break the 
political, economic and cultural connection with Britain. Republican 
statements insisted that they had a mandate for their struggle from both the 
people and the internees and the desire was that “the Irish people should 
enjoy justice, peace and prosperity, in a free united Ireland” (Long Kesh 
Comhairle Ceanntair, Sinn Féin, Irish News, 28 March 1972). In contrast to 
“the isolated terrorists” in the unionist statements, the “republican struggle 
for freedom” was presented as the manifestation of a birthright, a battle 
symbolised by the loyalty to the graves of the past.  
The loyalty of the loyalist paramilitaries, although to a different object, 
took on some similar features. The sacrifice of the loyalist paramilitaries in 
defending Protestants and the Union was a significant part of the 
representation of the “betrayed defender”. According to loyalist groups, the 
loyalist paramilitaries were defence forces helping the security forces. The 
loyalist groups thus felt betrayed when the British Government introduced 
internment of loyalists in February 1973. 
The loyalist paramilitaries were not given a prominent role in the 
different accounts of internment until after the internment of loyalists. The 
moderate unionist representation of the loyalist paramilitaries is quite 
interesting, for it shows that even though most acts of loyalist violence were 
condemned, it seemed to be important not to be considered an opponent of 
the loyalist internees. At some point it looked like the unionist parties almost 
competed to be seen as the strongest supporter of the loyalist internees (see, 
for example, Roy Bradford in News Letter, 29 September 1973 and Edward 
Burns in Irish Times, 4 October 1973). Several unionist representatives also 
initiated motions demanding the release of loyalist internees only, and 
several district councils adopted such motions (see Irish Independent, 28 
November 1973 and 21 December 1973; Belfast Telegraph, 13 December 
1973 and 20 December 1973).  
Nationalists challenged this reasoning and initially branded the loyalist 
paramilitaries as extremists, who attacked innocent Catholics. However, this 
image began to change after the first internment of loyalists in early 1973. 
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Loyalists were now, particularly in republican statements, also portrayed as 
class brothers and victims of internment, suffering in the same way as 
republican internees (see, for example, the statement by the Republican 
Clubs, Irish News, 31 January 1974; also joint statements printed in the Irish 
Times and Irish News in August 1974). 
Competing Approaches to Violence 
 
In a study of the discursive (de-)legitimisation of violence it is 
important to consider how the agents of violence are portrayed in the 
political statements: by presenting the agents of violence within a particular 
context the acts of violence might be explained and rationalised. With some 
exceptions, discourses on violence in the debate on internment echoed the 
various parties‟ representation of the use of emergency powers. On the one 
hand, the unionist movement in general legitimised state violence through an 
official legal mandate and the function of restoring order. In the case of the 
loyalist paramilitaries there was an ambivalent approach, however, and the 
question of purpose and context seem at least partly to come in to play when 
separating loyalist and republican violence. On the other hand, nationalist 
discourses stressed alternative sources of legitimacy. In the case of the 
republican groups, they referred to discrimination as well as human and 
national rights when justifying republican violence. Within the SDLP, 
however, violence seemed in general to have been delegitimized through 
references to moral values and inalienable human rights.  
 
Dimensions of Legitimacy: Democracy 
 
In the debate on internment all political parties presented “democracy” 
as the legitimate form of government. It is generally held that it is the 
commitment to popular rule which sets democracies apart from other 
political systems (Dalton, 1988, p. 206). This maxim was generally 
recognised in the internment debate, but the debate exposed conflicting 
representations of democracy. Some connected democracy to the procedures 
of the existing institutions of government; others linked it to ethnic/national 
rights. They also had different views on how the people were to conduct their 
“legitimate right to power”. Were the preferences of the people to be secured 
through institutionalised channels of representation, or should the people 
themselves defend their interests directly?  
 
Unionist Discourse on “Democracy” 
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To the Ulster Unionist Party, democracy was a set of procedures for the 
election of representatives who carried out “the rule of the people”. The 
decision to introduce internment was taken to protect this democracy. James 
Molyneaux observed that:  
in every election during the past 50 years they have shown their 
determination to remain part of the United Kingdom under the Crown. 
The electoral system is the same as in other parts of the United 
Kingdom – universal franchise of one man one vote. Is democracy to 
remain in Ulster or is the gun to take its place? (The Times, 16 August 
1971). 
Comments by Prime Minister Faulkner followed similar lines. Those 
who had been interned were interned because of their disrespect for the 
democratic means: “the essential conflict is between democracy on the one 
hand, on the other those who wish to bypass democracy by terrorist means” 
(Irish Times, 27 November 1971).
 
 
In general the unionist government disapproved of non-parliamentary 
methods and it berated both individuals and the elected representatives of the 
nationalist opposition for withdrawing from public bodies and declaring 
support for a rent and rates strike (Government Statement, 21 September 
1971). Although confirming the right to free speech (News Letter, 13 
September 1971), the government promulgated a six-month ban on parades 
and demonstrations when introducing internment: the security forces should 
not be diverted from their essential tasks at such a critical time (Belfast 
Telegraph, 9 August 1971).
8
  
The unionist representations of democracy changed somewhat, 
however, with the suspension of the Stormont parliament in March 1972 and 
the subsequent negotiations on power-sharing with nationalists. After the fall 
of Stormont and the agreement on power-sharing, the UUP found itself in a 
grave internal conflict: would a power-sharing assembly and Executive be 
democratic institutions?  
Brian Faulkner, the leader of the power-sharing fraction, viewed the 
power-sharing process as the route to a restoration of a Northern Ireland 
parliament, and thus also to peace, order and good government (News Letter, 
12 December 1973). Faulkner utterly rejected ideas of an independent Ulster: 
“Independence from Great Britain, of any style, under any name, and in any 
circumstances, is repugnant to our ideals, in complete opposition to our basic 
policy, and would be ruinous to our secure future and disastrous for our 
economic well-being” (Irish Times, 6 March 1973).  
The opponents of power-sharing in the UUP had a different 
interpretation and argued that the Council of Ireland proposed in the 
Narratives of Legitimacy 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 34 - 
 
Sunningdale Communiqué was the first step to a united Ireland. They 
therefore went into the United Ulster Unionist Council coalition with the 
DUP and Vanguard. Austin Ardill of the anti-power-sharing wing of the 
UUP claimed that the aim was, “to bring about the restoration of full 
parliamentary democracy in Northern Ireland” (News Letter, 26 February 
1974). This was despite the fact that the anti-power-sharing wing of the UUP 
also supported some non-constitutional actions such as the Ulster Workers 
Council strike (which eventually brought down the power-sharing 
institutions). John Taylor, also of the anti-power-sharing wing, stressed that 
the power-sharing institutions did not have the consent of the majority of 
Northern Ireland (News Letter, 2 March 1974). In contrast to Faulkner, 
Taylor did not rule out an independent Northern Ireland.  In a joint statement 
with the Vanguard leader, William Craig, he stated that:  
we don‟t agree with those who would accept membership of the U.K. at 
any price. If the British Government is not prepared to offer Ulster 
sufficient powers, then we are of the opinion that a negotiated 
independence for Ulster could be the best course of action for loyalists 
(Irish Times, 17 January 1973).  
 The Democratic Unionist Party primarily commented on the 
suspension of Stormont in terms of British citizenship rights (News Letter, 27 
March 1972). The calls for independence were strongly disputed by the DUP 
which instead advocated a stronger integration of Northern Ireland in the 
Union. This did not mean that the DUP was not also concerned with the 
“loyal Ulster people”. Even though the DUP primarily defended 
constitutional means of politics (see News Letter, 16 February 1972; 27 
March 1972) and Ian Paisley did not support the loyalist strike in the wake of 
the internment of loyalists (Irish Times, 8 February 1973), the party regularly 
defended the actions of loyalist paramilitary groups (see Rankin and Ganiel, 
this volume).  
 
Nationalist Discourse on “Democracy” 
 
Whereas both the DUP and the majority of the unionist parties related 
democracy to the rule of the majority, this view was strongly contested by 
nationalists. The SDLP generally stressed the importance of political 
representation, but did not regard the majority rule of the UUP in Northern 
Ireland to be real democracy. During the debate on internment the key 
element in the SDLP vision of real democracy was above all inclusion. New 
political institutions had to be built in order to include all sections of the 
community.  
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Although established as late as 1970, the SDLP had by the introduction 
of internment in August 1971, already acquired the experience of working 
both inside and outside the existing political institutions. The party‟s seven 
Stormont MPs decided to pull out of Stormont in the summer of 1971 in 
protest against the unionist government. When internment was introduced in 
August, the party supported a rent and rates strike and extended its boycott of 
public institutions (Irish News, 10 August 1971). Despite such support for 
civil disobedience, however, the position of the SDLP did differ from that of 
the civil rights and internees‟ groups (see below), since it continuously 
stressed the importance of political representation and responsible leadership. 
In John Hume‟s words, this was a time for brains, not for brawn (Irish News, 
11 September 1971).  
But even though the SDLP-deputies wanted to lead the people, they 
also recognised the importance of being in touch with popular sentiments. 
Representatives should not be too far ahead of the people, Gerry Fitt 
explained, when he refused to participate in talks with the unionist 
government after internment (The Times, 30 September 1971).   
Still, after the suspension of Stormont and its involvement in talks on 
power sharing, the SDLP resumed its cooperation with the British 
government and reversed its previous commitment not to participate in any 
institutions as long as internment remained in force. Now, representation and 
influence, it was claimed, made it possible for the SDLP to lobby for the 
release of internees. The SDLP leader, Ivan Cooper, warned against the 
dangers of taking politics back into the streets: “Demonstrations at this time 
will not bring internment to an end and will not secure the type of change 
needed in this community” (Belfast Telegraph, 9 August 1973).  
It was important for the SDLP to have an Irish dimension included in 
the Sunningdale Agreement. The majority within the party believed that the 
nationalist community in Northern Ireland could not give its full allegiance 
to a state that existed purely in a British context (Murray, 1998, p. 22). Even 
though the Executive broke down the party still held on to the constitutional 
approach to politics and the vision of partnership “not merely in Northern 
Ireland and within Ireland, but in a very real sense between the two islands 
themselves” (John Duffy, Irish News, 20 July 1974).  
 
Civil Rights Movement and Republican Discourse on “Democracy” 
 
When internment was introduced, NICRA immediately called for 
public demonstrations throughout Northern Ireland and for workers to 
prepare for a general strike (News Letter, 10 August 1971). The association 
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claimed that the people themselves ought to be safeguarding their rights 
against incursions from the government: “We believe the greatest weapons 
of the people in the campaign are civil resistance and disobedience” (Ian 
Barr [chairman of the NICRA branch at the prison ship, Maidstone], Irish 
News, 15 September 1971). The internees in the Long Kesh internment camp 
similarly supported popular control and direct action stressing that: 
“Republicanism is concerned with the right of the people to control the 
political, economic and cultural life of our country” (Irish Times, 28 July 
1972). 
In other words, people should not wait for the politicians to act in their 
defence; the people should act themselves. The strong belief in the wisdom 
of the people and the fundamental distrust in politicians were common to 
both NICRA and the various internees groups established in the internment 
camps. The internees in Long Kesh claimed for example that, “the ordinary 
man having borne the brunt of the suffering over the past few years against 
the might of the British Army, must assert his will on the wily politicians 
who even now are snarling at each other in their attempt to claim political 
capital from a false victory” (Irish News, 25 April 1972).  
The internees at Long Kesh rejected the SDLP‟s claims that its strategy 
would eventually secure the end of internment, claiming that while the 
people suffered, the SDLP connived with the enemies of Ireland and reneged 
on all its promises: “You speak for no other than yourselves” (Irish News, 6 
December 1975). Although sharing a common view on popular participation, 
there were nonetheless differences between the republican groups. Whereas 
the Republican Clubs supported some kind of political action inside the 
existing structures,
 9
 the Provisional republicans, both inside and outside the 
internment camps, ruled out such action.
 10
 In the Provisional view, 
democracy could never be achieved through “partitionist institutions” (Irish 
News, 6 December 1975). The Irish people could only achieve justice in a 
free United Ireland, and it was important that the people rejected the “palace-
seekers” who wanted to divert people from the true national aim (Irish News, 
28 March 1972).  
 
Competing Approaches to Democracy 
 
As we have seen above, the representations of democracy differed 
considerably among the political parties. The UUP in the first year of the 
debate, and later the Faulkner unionists defended representation in elected 
institutions as the main system of popular rule. The SDLP and the anti-
power-sharing fraction of the UUP, also stressed the importance of 
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representatives, but departed from “the responsible model” in that they did 
not rule out civil disobedience. The civil rights association and the 
republican (at times also loyalist) groups played down the role of the 
representative in politics altogether, and connected popular rule to direct 
popular action.  
Another significant difference concerns the issue of majority rule 
versus “inclusive” government. Here the initial pattern was that the unionist 
parties viewed democracy as majority rule, whereas the SDLP, the Alliance 
party, the NICRA, and the republican groups considered the practice of 
majority rule exclusionary and undemocratic. When the Stormont parliament 
was suspended, however, this pattern changed. The UUP split on the issue of 
a power-sharing Executive, and the SDLP came under criticism from NICRA 
and, in particular, internees and Provisional republicans for taking part in the 
Executive. Now the unionist parties did not agree as to which measures 
would secure democracy: the DUP claimed that democracy could only be 
safeguarded if the Union was retained. Faulkner and his supporters chose 
power-sharing whereas his critics in the UUP and Vanguard indicated 
support for an independent Northern Ireland. In this matter, the logic of the 
latter resembled that of the Provisional republicans. Both perspectives linked 
democracy to some sort of ethnic/national right to autonomy, rather than to 
participation in the existing institutions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the political debate on internment has revealed that the 
dominant unionist representation of legitimacy was linked to the state in an 
almost tautological relationship: the internment powers were legitimate 
because they were settled in law; force used by the police and the army was 
legitimate because they had a mandate from the state; and democracy was 
viewed as the implementation of majority rule as set down in the governing 
procedures of the state. Consequently the principal points of reference for 
legitimacy were the procedures of the state and the “will of the majority”.  
Within such a framework, opposition to the state became illegitimate 
by definition, and the only valid political question regarding internment was 
whether it served the purpose of restoring order or not. Internment was aimed 
at restoring order by removing the “terrorists” from the streets. The 
“terrorists”, portrayed as isolated characters without context and history, and 
with the creation of fear as their only rationale, played a decisive role in the 
unionist construction of legitimacy, proving that the conflict was a matter of 
order, rather than of state legitimacy.  
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But nationalists saw things differently: many felt that the unionist 
hegemony had been clearly exposed in the 1960s and internment accelerated 
the ongoing process of political mobilisation of the nationalist community. 
The political mobilisation was taken to a new level by a wide-ranging 
withdrawal from public positions, an illegal rent and rates strike, and through 
an intensified campaign of protest.  
The nationalist counter-narrative of legitimacy was above all exposed 
in the way nationalists challenged the unionist priority of the order of society 
over the rights of the individual. In the nationalist narrative, human rights 
were made the defining source of legitimacy and consequently, rights were 
made a product of being human, rather than being a citizen in a state: if the 
state violated these rights, it could not be regarded legitimate. Nationalists 
also increasingly turned to international sources for validation of their 
approach, thus “removing” legitimacy from the political and territorial 
confinements of the state, and relocating it at an international level.  
There is no doubt that the division between a dominant narrative of 
legitimacy on the one hand, and a counter-narrative on the other, was deep in 
the debate on internment. Still, the debate on internment also exposed 
another line of division, supplementing this dualism: between a political 
centre on the one hand, and a politically marginalized periphery on the other.  
The fall of Stormont in 1972 changed the balance of power in Northern 
Ireland: the UUP lost governing powers, and the unionist opposition lost the 
power it had acquired by being the closest challengers to the UUP. The 
SDLP, on the other hand, increased its influence: From being a party 
permanently blocked as a minority in Northern Ireland, the party now 
became the “voice” of the minority in talks with the British government and 
in the power-sharing Executive. This alteration of power relations 
challenged, or perhaps more accurately supplemented, the general pattern of 
a unionist hegemonic narrative of legitimacy contested by a nationalist 
counter-narrative.  
The SDLP developed a more functional approach to law and 
democracy during its participation in the power-sharing executive. The 
keyword behind this transition seems to be “trust”; the SDLP‟s experience of 
increased political influence went hand in hand with the development of faith 
in the processes of government. In contrast, parts of the UUP, the DUP, and 
the loyalist paramilitaries went in another direction after the suspension of 
the Stormont parliament (and also the internment of loyalists). With the 
Stormont government replaced with a British government defending power 
sharing and internment of loyalists, the sense of faith and assurance of 
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political influence were disappearing. Legitimacy was now disconnected 
from the existing institutions of government and situated in principles of 
British civil liberties or in the idea of Ulster self-determination. 
The construction of legitimacy must therefore be viewed in relation to 
trust and influence: political pragmatism and functionalism, which 
legitimised the call for the restoration of order, required a sense of trust in the 
system and a confidence of political influence. In contrast, the lack of trust 
and influence seems to have fostered an approach based on rights and 
principles external to the established institutions of government; an approach 
which could justify resistance and change. 
 
 
Endnotes 
* I am grateful to all of those who have offered comments on this study at 
different stages, in particular the late Professor Øyvind Bjørnson, Professor 
William Hubbard, Svein Atle Skålevåg, Merethe Winsents and Maja Zahl. I 
am also most grateful to Catherine O‟Donnell and Katy Hayward for their 
very constructive and motivating comments and to the participants at the 
Peace Lines conference in Dublin in June 2007, for inspiring and fruitful 
discussions.  
 
i
 In that period, a total of 1981 persons were held without trial: 107 
“loyalists” and 1874 “republicans”.  
2 In the two years prior to internment, 66 people were killed; in the first 
seventeen months of internment, the number had risen almost tenfold to 
610 (Dixon, 2001, p. 118). Following the suspension of the Northern 
Ireland government in February 1972, internment was continued by the 
British government. 
3
 Weber‟s concept of legitimacy has been criticised, particularly for its non-
normative character. Jürgen Habermas (1996) has stressed the importance of 
employing a normative concept of legitimacy through an understanding of 
the relationship between solidarity and communication.  
4 The Compton Committee was set up to investigate allegations that the men 
being interrogated after their arrests on 9 August 1971 had been subjected to 
brutal treatment (Elliott and Flackes, 1999, p. 211). The report, 
acknowledged that there had been ill treatment of internees, but it rejected 
claims of systematic torture. Another committee (the Parker committee) 
investigating the methods used in interrogating, later held that the methods 
were justified in exceptional circumstances (Elliott and Flackes, 1999, p. 
391). 
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5 For example, one of the internees, Patrick Shivers was awarded £15,000 in 
February 1974 by the Ulster High Court in damages for wrongful arrest and 
torture (News Letter, 14 February 1974). 
6 The Commission determined that some techniques employed in 1971 did 
constitute torture and that other procedures were inhumane and degrading 
(Donohue, 2001, p. 121). Yet, the Commission was overruled in the 
European Court of Human Rights in 1978, which rejected the word torture, 
but accepted that the internees had suffered „inhuman and degrading 
treatment‟ (Coogan, 1995, p. 129).  
7 There could be various explanations for this. This type of statement might 
have been censored by the newspapers, which declined to publicise what 
may be viewed as violent propaganda. It might also relate to the fact that 
republican statements tended to deal more with the effects of state violence.  
8 The Alliance Party also generally argued that civil disobedience was not 
a legitimate democratic method; instead the party called for talks and a 
campaign that could foster understanding (see for example Robert G. 
Cooper in Irish News, 21 August 1971 and Basil Glass in Irish News, 13 
June 1974). 
9
 The Republican Clubs (Official Sinn Féin) viewed elections as one of many 
ways to voice public opinion, rather than the main channel of popular 
influence. When they decided to contest elections, the Long Kesh branch of 
this group supported the move, arguing that by participation in the elections, 
they were putting forward progressive and revolutionary politics to the 
electorate (Irish News, 21 June, 1973). 
10
 Some branches of NICRA also argued against the participation in the 
existing structures. One branch of NICRA ,for instance, sardonically 
remarked that the SDLP and the Republican Clubs “nearly broke their necks 
to get involved in another British institution which clearly has not a hope in 
hell of achieving any scrap of democracy” (Bannside and District Civil 
Rights Association, Irish News, 8 July 1975).  
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